Tim Keller and Cognitive Propositionalism

Examining the framework further

This is a post in my series on George Lindbeck and the modern American church. I am examining whether Keller’s argument in “The Reason for God” is an example of what Lindbeck calls “cognitive propositionalism” . My goal, in line with Lindbeck, is not to “critique Keller” but to identify what his mode of argument and its corresponding form of theology “does”. I’m hoping to figure out where we are [we being the modern American church], and how we got here [to a place of declining religiosity, where church attendance seems extraneous.]

Though time will only truly substantiate such claims, Tim Keller seems to have been one of the most prominent pastors and apologists of modern evangelicalism. His reach has spread far beyond his successful New York City churches and has led to numerous church plants, hundreds of pastors trained in his philosophy of ministry, and thousands of lay Christians who have been positively influenced by his books. He also founded a church planting initiative that continues to extend his reach and his strategy far beyond his home church.

            Keller’s form of religion dovetails well with what Lindbeck calls a “cognitive-propositional” approach, and I’d like to illustrate this by looking at one of his best selling books, The Reason for God. Keller’s massive influence makes him a good figure to evaluate. [I’d welcome in the comments any further engagement with Keller’s writings that might push back on the view of Keller as a “cognitive-propositionalist” thinker.] It’s also worth noting that I intend this not so much as a critique as an illustration of what cognitive-propositionalism looks like “in the wild”; I admire Keller and his legacy and recognize what an impact he has had on thousands of Christians. I also think that its possible that Keller’s ministry at Redeemer was not itself entirely cognitive-propositionalist; that might also be something to discuss further in the comments. My observation is intended to be limited strictly to the resonances between Reason for God and Lindbeck’s articulation of cognitive-propositionalism.

“If you say all truth-claims are power plays, then so is your statement”.¹

Tim Keller’s Reason for God: Belief in an Age of Skepticism attempts to get religious skeptics to think about why they don’t believe in God. Even those who don’t believe in God, the argument goes, believe in something. Doubters, however, do not often take the time to query what it is that they do believe in in order to responsibly understand these commitments. Keller’s “thesis on doubt”, as he puts it, is as follows:

My thesis is that you come to recognize the beliefs on which your doubts about Christianity are based, and if you seek as much proof for those beliefs as you seek from Christians for theirs- you will discover that your doubts are not as solid as they first appeared”.²

The way into Christianity according to this strategy is through the back door, which remains largely unguarded.

 This approach to explaining the Christian faith is a historically modern one. Classical proofs for the existence of God (such as those offered by Thomas Aquinas) and ontological proofs (such as those of St. Anselm) rely first on logic to lead an individual toward God by means of the human mind. Tim Keller’s apologetics- and this book is undoubtedly an apologetic- borrow from the work of Corneilus van Til and Frances Scaheffer whose apologetic strategies relied not on the rules of logic as much as the shared understanding of the world that was underlaid with divine truth.³

Apologetic strategies sees the truths of Scripture as the water that all men swim in; part of the apologetic task of this school is making people aware of what makes them buoyant. Unlike classical proofs, modern apologetics tends rely on logic and Scripture simultaneously, making the approach a bit less heavy handed, though no less confident, than the classical proof apologists.

Keller’s instincts are so common- perhaps due to his influence- that their particular character is invisible to many. A good example comes in his chapter entitled “The Church Is Responsible for So Much Injustice”. In it Keller introduces the common concern that the Church does not demonstrate any value to the world, and that at points it actually does harm. The epigraph to the chapter includes two examples of this view:

“I have to doubt any religion that has so many fanatics and hypocrites,’ insitedn Helen, a law student. “There are so many people who are not religious at all who are more kind and even more moral than many of the Christians I know.”

“The church has a history of supporting injustice, of destroying culture,” responded Jessica, another law student. “If Christianity is the true religion, how could this be?”⁴

Keller continues:

So we have to address the behavior of Christians- individual and corporate- that has undermined the plausibility of Christianity for so many people. Three issues stand out. First, there is the truth of Christians’ glaring character flaws. If Christianity is the truth, why are so many non-Christians living better lives than the Christians? Second, there ist he issue of war and violence. If Christianity is the tuth, why has the institutional church supported war, injustice, and violence over the years? Third, there is the issue of fanataicism. Even if Christian teaching has much to offer, why would we want to be together with so many smug, self-righteous, dangerous fanatics?⁵

Keller is right that the “crushing disappointment” of living with Christians who don’t live up to their ideals has turned many a person against the Christian religion. Why this happens does serve as a sort of counter-apologetic against the faith- if Christians are so bad, why would I want to be one? Is there anything to the Christian religion, if people who espouse it are can be such jerks? Why does the truth about God not immunize people against evil deeds?

            Keller notes two theological claims here. The first is that common grace explains why non-Christians can do good things, because all good deeds are ultimately attributable to God. The second is that all Christians remain sinful and flawed, even after they become Christians. They remain daily in need of grace, not perfected once they accept Christ.

            Keller goes further and describes the ways that “biblical religion” shares the critiques of today’s secular atheists. The prophets also spoke against those who brought sacrifices to the temple and also used uneven scales, and Jesus was always interrogating the Pharisees whose religious practices ignored the needy in their midst. In Keller’s words:

“In Jesus’ and the prophets’ critique, self-righteous religion is always marked by insensitivity to issues of social justice, while faith is marked by profound concern for the poor and marginalized.”⁶

Keller names two significant examples of critiques coming from “within the faith”- abolitionists, who saw slavery as a biblical evil, and civil rights activists who mined the resources of their Christian faith to defy unjust civil orders.

Keller is factually correct on all of these matters. Abolitionists and civil rights critiques were motivated and bolstered by Christian commitment, and it is undeniably the case that the prophets of the Old Testament were significantly preoccupied with the ways that religious people oppressed the poor. Keller’s concern that the church be a place where the poor are provided for and the widow and orphan protected are biblical concerns and should exist in all congregations.

But Keller is using such examples to persuade unbelievers that their critiques are actually the Bible’s own critiques. In his words:

“Why mention all of these examples? They are evidence that Dr. King was right. when people have done injustice in the name of Christ they are not being true to the spirit of the one who himself died as a victim of injustice and who called for the forgiveness of his enemies. When people give their lives to liberate others as Jesus did, they are realizing the true Christianity that Martin Luther King,Jr., Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and other Christian voices have called for.”⁷

Keller’s strategy here is to persuade those outside the church that their critiques of Christians are shared by Christians- that indeed “true Christians” are more like what secular atheists are calling for all people to be. Keller makes this move because he thinks convincing people that the Bible shares their own concerns will convince people that Christianity is true. Once non-Christians realize that their arguments against Christianity are actually Christian, they may make the leap.

Persuasion, under such a view, becomes a chief tool for the preacher. By adjusting a bit here and reorganizing people’s beliefs a bit over there, false beliefs will becoming apparent. Then, unbelievers can enter the church. Adjusting what people think about God is the primary function of Keller’s book.⁸

It is worth mentioning here that this strategy can work. There are many people who have been invited into the faith due to Keller’s apologetics and who have been persuaded by the truth of Christianity due to his teaching and preaching. My critique here is not about whether Keller’s teaching is true, or whether his strategy works. My interest is in what kind of church such a strategy invites people in to. Once they are persuaded, what lies inside the door?

It seems clear to me that Keller’s strategy in A Reason for God is a form of what Lindbeck calls “cognitive propositionalism”.⁹ Remember that cognitive propositionalism is a form of doctrine and religion where truth can be reached through proposition and the exercise of logic. It “works” by communicating truth that can be affirmed or rejected. The boundaries of doctrinal truth are fixed, and individuals who adhere to said doctrine (“religionists”) are those who adhere to the stated doctrinal boundaries: “For a propositionalist, if a doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if it is once false, it is always false.”¹⁰ There is no way to square doctrinal disagreements without one party lessening or altering their theological commitments.

Critiquing cognitive-propositionalism does not mean critiquing a correspondence theory of truth. It means critiquing a view of religion where the most significant aspect of “being religious” is equivalent with assenting to the right doctrinal or intellectual frameworks:

for the cognitivist, it is chiefly technical theology and doctrine which are propositional, while on the alternate model, propositional truth and falsity characterize ordinary religious language when it is ued to mold lives through prayer, praise, preaching, and exhortation.It is only on this level that human beings linguistically exhibit thei tuth or falsity, their correspondence or lack of correspondence to the Ultimate Mystery. Technical theology and official doctrine, in contrast, are second-order discourse about the first-intentional uses of religious language.¹¹

Lindbeck spent less time on the cognitive propositionalist view than he did on others. This, I suspect, is because he did not realize how prominent it was in many religious circles. (Post-liberals are somewhat notoriously ignorant of “evangelical” versions of the faith.).

The church that Keller invites people to through his mode of argument is a place where people convene once they have been persuaded of the existence of God. There is, however, no clear need for them to do so. By Keller’s explanation, it seems as if all of the hard work has been done, privately by the individual, before they enter the church’s doors. Once they arrive there is nothing left to do- or if there is, it must be described separately from the means by which they were converted. Individuals go to church because they are Christians, but it is not clear why they must.¹²

This is precisely the weakness Lindbeck identifies with both cognitive-propositionalist and experiential expressivist views (I actually suspect that CP and EE views are a circle- you lean far enough into one end and come out the other. I can explain this in a later post).

“If a person invests deeply in the cognitive-propositionalist school, the "hard work" is the work of intellectual convincing and being convinced. Once that work is done, the church exists primarily to reinforce these intellectual commitments. Lindbeck writes, “the structures of modernity press individuals to meet God first in the depths of their souls and then, perhaps, if they find something personally congenial, to become part of a tradition or join a church. Their actual behavior may not conform to this model, but it is the way they experience themselves. Thus the traditions of religious thought and practice into which Westerners are most likely to be socialized conceals from them the social origins of their conviction that religion is a highly private and individual matter.”¹³

[Note- this quotation is actually in reference to the experiential-expressivist view- further fodder for the argument that EE and CP are different forms of the same practice.]

One final observation. If the work of “the gospel” is primarily done in the mind, the body is left neglected. It is unclear what the actual need for gathering bodily is. Under such a view, the body is a thinker and a doer but not a sign, where in anointing and kneeling and feeding the whole person become the means of religion itself.¹⁴ The challenge ahead is to communicate the goods of the gospel and the goods of the Body as if they were the same goods- which, of course, they are.

Is there another way, that does not separate out explaining the goods of the gospel from seeing these goods as existing only in the gathered body? We’ll examine that question in the weeks to come.

1. Keller, 38.

2. Keller, xviii.

3. I know that there are actually deep disagreements between CVT and Keller, particularly regarding what is “shared” knowledge between believer and nonbeliever. I still think its fair to say that Keller’s method was highly influenced by van Til, even if there ended up being significant disagreements on how this form of apologetics worked.

4. Keller, 51.

5. Keller, 52.

6. Keller, 60.

7. Keller, 67.

8. This raises another interesting question; is a book necessarily cognitive-propositionalist? I think the answer is no, and I’ll give you some examples soon.

9. Again, you may be able to argue that Keller is “not CP” in other books or in his actual ministry. I’d be interested to hear these arguments.

10. Lindbeck, 16.

11. Lindbeck, 69.

12. Certainly Keller did not intend for his apologetic strategy to diminish the significance of gathering as the work of the church- but often this is the way unintended consequences work.

13. Lindbeck, 22.

14. If the body is a sign, and indeed the only means whereby anyone is religious, caring for the poor cannot be in anyway separated from a lfie of charity. “Lord Jesus Christ, have mercy on me a sinner” is the prayer that leads outward to mission; humans are only living sacrificess, from whose lives flow acts of mercy. But that’s a story for another day.